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SVM Training Phase Reduction 
using Dataset Feature Filtering 
 
Abstract—Obfuscation is a strategy employed by malware 
writers to camouflage the telltale signs of malware and thereby 
undermine anti-malware software and make malware analysis 
difficult for anti-malware researchers.  This paper investigates 
the use of supervised learning machines to identify malware and 
investigates the problems of feature identification and feature 
reduction.  We present several methods of filtering features in 
the temporal domain prior to applying the reduced feature set to 
the learning machines.  The findings have identified several 
methods of feature reduction and are presented their viability as 
filters are assessed. 
Keywords-component; Obfuscation, Packers, Polymorphism, 
Metamorphism Malware, KNN, SVM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have seen massive growth in malware, with 
signature detection and monitoring suspected code for known 
security vulnerabilities becoming ineffective and intractable. 
In response, researchers need to adopt new detection 
approaches that outmanoeuvre the different attack vectors and 
obfuscation methods employed by the malware writers.  
Detection approaches that use the host environment’s native 
op-codes at run-time will circumvent many of the malware 
writers’ attempts to evade detection.  One such approach, as 
proposed in this paper, is the analysis of op-code density 
features using supervised learning machines performed on 
features obtained from run-time traces.  In further research we 
intend to expand the detection methods by investigating N-
gram size, which will dramatically increase the number of 
features.  With this anticipated explosion of features we have 
chosen to investigate methods to prune irrelevant features. 
While Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is a popular 
method to reduce features in subspace, this paper aims to 
identify feature reduction in the temporal (original dataset) 
space. 
Others have carried out research into indentifying malware 
based on statistical op-code analysis, such as Lakhotia et al [1] 
that presented a static detection of obfuscated calls relating to 
push, pop and ret op-codes mapped to stack operations.  The 
approach presented in this paper performs dynamic analysis 
and evaluates the full spectrum of op-codes, which builds 
upon the work carried out by Bilar [2]. 
For large datasets, or costly (computation) distance 
function, the training process associated with learning 
machines can become intractable.  Thus, the feature explosion 
that occurs with N-grams for large values of N needs to be 
addressed.  This paper investigates several approaches to 
filtering out irrelevant features. 
The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows: Section 
II gives an overview of the approach.  Section III describes the 
dataset.  Section IV details the test platform and monitoring 
tools. Section V details the Support Vector Machine 
configuration and the results obtained.  These results are used 
as a reference to gauge the successfulness of the filtering 
approaches.  Section VI gives a brief overview of competing 
malware detection strategy.  Section VII introduces and 
presents empirical data that characterise the different feature 
filtering approaches.  The penultimate section, VIII, 
summarises the results and key characteristics recorded during 
these experiments.  Finally, Section IX concludes by 
comparing the results with other research and details future 
work that will be carried out as part of this research. 
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
The motivation for this research is to reduce the 
computational overhead required when N-gram analysis is 
performed on low-level fine grain data.   Therefore, 
developing a lightweight filter that will reduce the number of 
features to be processed will in turn reduce the computational 
overhead; thus making the training phase of the SVM 
approach a viable solution for N-gram analysis where large 
feature sets are generated.  Fig. 1 illustrates an overview of the 
approach taken in this paper.  The programs under 
investigation are run in a test environment with a debug tool 
monitoring the runtime op-codes.  After completion, the data 
is parsed into op-code histograms and after some conditioning 
the dataset is passed to the SVM to perform feature selection 
of the optimum features that can be used to detect malware.  
In parallel, the dataset is processed with various filtering 
algorithms in an attempt to identify the op-codes selected by 
the SVM.  The objective is that a lightweight filter can be 
identified and used to pre-process the dataset before feeding it 
to the SVM. 
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 III. TEST PLATFORM 
The main challenge with dynamic analysis is to ensure that 
the malicious code path is executed during investigation.  
Three dynamic approaches exist: 1) Native (debugger), 2) 
Emulation and 3) Virtualization.  Each has to address malware 
evasion techniques that may attempt to fool the dynamic 
analysis into completing its analysis without running the 
malicious code [5]. 
While native environments present the malware with a real 
platform on which to run, this presents issues with control and 
‘clear up’ of the malware infection.  The program under 
investigation needs to be monitored during execution.  There 
are several debugger tools available to monitor and intercept 
programs - IDA Pro, Ollydbg and WinDb32, which are 
popular choices for malware analysis. 
A virtualization approach is chosen as it provides isolation 
by decoupling the virtual machine (malware environment) and 
the OS.  The isolation provided by a hypervisor in a 
virtualised system prevents the malware from infecting the 
host OS or other applications that are running on adjacent 
virtual machine on the same physical machine.  Prior to 
performing the analysis, the virtualized environment files 
(virtual images) are backed-up (snapshot).  After the analysis 
is complete, the infected files are discarded and replaced with 
the clean snapshot. 
The test platform consists of a QEMU-KVM hypervisor 
with Windows XP (SP3) installed.  Ollydbg is chosen because 
it is open source and supports the StrongOD plug-in to prevent 
the malware from detecting that it is being monitored. 
IV. DATASET 
Classification tasks involve separating data into training 
and test data.  Each training-set instance is assigned a target 
value/label i.e. benign or malicious.  The goal of the SVM is 
to construct a model that predicts the target values of the test 
data.  Table 1, lists the dataset with the benign files being 
Windows XP executables.  The dataset is constructed from 
runtime traces that are parsed to create histograms of op-code 
density.  The malware samples are restricted to programs that 
indicated that they are packed or use encryption, which is 
determined by using the Ollydbg plug-in StrongOD. 
Table 1 Dataset 
 Dataset Training Validation 
Benign 260 230 30 
Malicious 350 310 40 
Total 610 540 70 
While there are 344 different Intel op-codes, only 149 
different op-codes are recorded during the captured datasets 
for all programs traced during this experiment.  The dataset is 
normalised by calculating the percentage density of op-codes 
rather than the absolute op-code count to remove time 
variance introduced by different run lengths of the various 
programs.  The dataset is sorted into most commonly 
occurring op-codes as illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2 Histogram: Op-code Percentage 
 The dataset is marshalled into matrix format so that the 
data could be manipulated easily by Matlab, as detailed in 
Table 2. Note – the rank value versus structure size shows that 
there is a linear dependency between rows i.e. redundant 
information exists within the dataset. 
Table 2 Number of files in datasets 
Variable name Size (r/c) Rank Comment 
X 623/149 106 Total data 
Training 561/149 104 Model training 
Test 62/149 61 Validation data 
Label 1/149 N/A Training label 
An initial assessment of the data shows two key properties 
a) The distribution of the various op-codes does not show any 
consistent distribution shapes; rather op-code distribution 
changes greatly as illustrated by the difference between mov 
and ret op-codes, described later in VII: ‘Area of Intersect’.  
Therefore, no one data shape could be assumed and hence a 
non-parametric method should be used. b) The data values are 
a percentage of the op-codes within a particular program. For 
example, 0 means that op-code does not occur within that 
program or 0.25 means that 25% of the program comprises of 
that op-code.  To improve the performance of the SVM the 
data is linearly scaled (0, +1). 
V. SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a technique used for 
data classification and was introduced by Boser et al in 1992 
[4] and is categorised as a kernel method.  The kernel method 
algorithm depends on dot-products function, which can be 
replaced by other kernel functions that map the data into a 
higher dimensional feature space.  This has two advantages: 
Firstly, the ability to generate a non-linear decision plane and 
secondly, allows the user to apply a classification to data that 
do not have an intuitive dimensional vector space i.e. SVM 
training when the data has a non-regular or unknown 
distribution [16].  The dataset consists of 149 different op-
codes, each having their own unique distribution 
characteristics and therefore a SVM is an appropriate choice.  
As mentioned earlier, the data is linearly scaled to improve the 
performance of the SVM.  The main advantages of scaling are 
a) it avoids attributes with greater numeric ranges dominating 
those with smaller numeric ranges and b) it avoids numerical 
difficulties during the calculation as kernel values usually 
depend on the inner products of feature vectors, e.g. in the 
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case of the linear kernel and the polynomial kernel, large 
attribute values might cause numerical problems [17]. 
The RBF (Radial Basis Function) kernel is used as it is 
considered a reasonable first choice in that it provides a non-
linear mapping of samples into a higher dimensional space.  
This caters for instances where the relationship between the 
class label and attributes is non-linear.  
SVM is used to create a reference datum to validate the 
filter experiments that are presented in the subsequence 
sections.  The SVM is configured to traverse through the 
dataset searching for op-codes that have a positive impact on 
the classification of benign and malicious software.  The 
search starts with six op-codes scanning across the complete 
data sequence for all unique permutations for that number of 
op-codes.  The search is repeated for five and then four op-
code sequences.  An average of these results is sorted by most 
occurrences as illustrated in Fig 3, which show the most 
important op-codes as chosen by the SVM.  Only unique op-
codes are selected for each SVM classification test and no 
duplicates of repeated op-code patterns are processed.  Key 
points to note are: 
1) The 6 op-codes ja, adc, sub, inc, add and rep, each 
having an importance rating of more than 20% of the 
peak detection rate, are selected as the most important 
indicators for classifying benign and malicious software. 
2) mov has a negative impact on the classification and 
identification of software. i.e. when mov is part of the 
analysis data the output/classification is always incorrect. 
The mov has a high density (30% [2] and 40% in the 
presented dataset) in both benign and malicious software. 
3) Polymorphic and encryption based malware 
commonly use the xor instruction as the 
transfer/encryption function.  Despite the fact that several 
polymorphic and encryption based malware samples are 
used in both the training and validation dataset xor is not 
highlighted as an indicator of malware. 
 
Fig. 3 SVM Op-code Sensitivity 
VI. RELATED WORK 
There has been extensive research into the detection of 
malicious code using both static and dynamic analysis.  
Malware research can be categorised not only in terms of 
static and dynamic analysis but also in how the information is 
processed after it is captured.  Popular research methods 
include: Control Flow Graphs (CFG) for both course and fine 
grain analysis, State machines to model system behaviour, 
mapping stack operations and mechanisms to detect malicious 
behaviour for known vulnerabilities. 
CFG analysis has played a key role in the research.  Bilar [6] 
compared the statically generated CFG of benign and 
malicious code.  Their findings showed a difference in the 
basic block count for benign and malicious code.  Bilar 
concluded that malicious code has a lower basic block count, 
implying a simpler structure: Less interaction, fewer branches 
and less functionality. 
Christodorescu et al [7] presented a semantic aware 
technique that used CFG model checking to identify 
components of malware using previously specified malicious 
code templates.  These templates are constructed using a 3-
tuple signature that consists of instructions, variables and 
symbolic constants.  They addressed some issues relating to 
obfuscated code such as ‘dead code’ insertion, register 
reassignment and code sequencing. 
Vinod et al [8] proposed a method that constructed CFG 
nodes from blocks of de-obfuscated (Normalised) code of a 
known malware program.  These blocks of instructions are 
compared for similarities to identify variants of the malware.  
Zhang et al [9] proposed a similar method that pattern-
matched code fragments to determine if two code fragments 
are similar enough to exhibit functional equivalency. 
Bonfante et al [10] extended this research by using a 
reduced CFG to reduce the effects of code reordering as used 
in obfuscation. Their experiments showed that CFG size 
affected the false positive error rate i.e. decreasing the CFG 
size increased the false positive error rates. 
Vulnerabilities have been the Achilles heel of software 
security, which malware writers have continuously targeted, 
with stack exploits being a major issue.  Lakhotia et al [1] 
presented a method to detect obfuscated calls relating to push, 
pop and ret that are mapped to stack operations.  An abstract 
stack model is constructed from results obtained from 
program executions.  Their work does not address situations 
where push and pop instructions are decomposed into multiple 
instructions, such as directly manipulating the stack pointer 
using mov commands. 
The lack of user input validation has been another security 
weakness that has lead to many malware attacks.  Newsome et 
al [11] proposed a dynamic taint analysis for automatically 
detecting malware attacks.  Their approach is fine-grained 
analysis that could detect overwrite attacks that utilised 
vulnerability and exploits. 
Monitoring program behaviour to determine malicious 
activity has been another avenue of research.  Ellis et al [12] 
proposed a dynamic detection system that used behavioural 
signatures of worm operations to identify worms. One such 
behaviour is that a worm acts like a server when infecting a 
host and after the infection is complete, it changes its 
behaviour from a server to client as it attempts to infect 
adjacent hosts. 
OS calls analysis has also provided an avenue of research.  
Okazaki et al [13] proposed an anomaly-based approach to 
analyse program behaviour, based on profiling OS calls on a 
Unix platform, and checking whether the system is being used 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
-J
A
-A
D
C
-S
U
B
-I
N
C
-A
D
D
-R
E
P
-S
H
R
D
-F
IN
IT
-S
H
L
-M
O
V
S
X
-F
C
O
M
P
P
-F
P
R
E
M
-F
X
A
M
-F
A
B
S
-F
S
U
B
-X
L
A
T
-J
B
E
-F
X
C
H
-C
L
D
-J
O
-I
M
U
L
-S
E
T
L
E
-J
N
B
-M
U
L
-J
B
-N
E
G
-X
C
H
G
-S
B
B
-W
A
IT
-S
E
T
L
-S
A
R
-P
O
P
A
D
-O
R
-A
N
D
-F
S
T
C
W
Support Vector Machine
Op-code Importance
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 I
m
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
in a different manner.  The model is constructed by ranking 
the OS calls based on their popularity during normal operation.  
The model is used to compare the behaviour of running 
programs using a distance algorithm that eliminated system 
variance.  Hofmeyr et al [14] also used anomaly detection 
based upon the sequence of OS calls. A normal profile 
obtained from the sequence of OS calls is compared against 
suspected binaries using hamming distance calculated on the 
sequences of OS calls. 
Sekar et al [15] used Finite State Automata (FSA) to 
represent OS call sequences. The binary is executed multiple 
times and recorded the OS calls to create the FSA models.  
Anomaly detection is achieved by comparing the FSAs with 
the run-time sequence of OS calls.  Ruschitzka et al [16] 
presented an approach based on the sequence of OS calls that 
is similar to [15]. 
Malware has often attempted to hide its presence by 
injecting itself into other file and performing entry point 
obfuscation.  Rabek et al [18] proposed an anomaly based 
technique that used both static and dynamic analysis to detect 
injected, dynamically generated and obfuscated code.  During 
static analysis the location of each OS call is identified within 
the program and then when the program runs, each OS call is 
verified against the original location. 
N-grams are based on a signature approach that relies on 
small sequences of strings or byte codes that are used to detect 
malware.  Santos et al [19] demonstrated that n-gram 
signatures could be used to detect unknown malware. The 
experiment extracted code and texts fragments from a large 
database of programs executions to form signatures that are 
classified using machine learning methods  
Sekar et al [20] implemented an n-gram approach and 
compared it to a FSA approach. They evaluated the two 
approaches on httpd, ftpd, and nsfd protocols. They found that 
the FSA method has a lower false-positive rate when 
compared to the n-gram approach.  Li et al [21] describe N-
gram analysis, at byte level, to compose models derived from 
learning the file types the system intends to handle. Li et al 
found that applying an N-gram analysis at byte level (N=1) on 
PDF files with embedded malware proved an effective 
technique of detecting malicious PDF files. 
However, Li et al only detected malware embedded at the 
beginning or end of a file; therefore any malware embedded in 
the middle of the file will go undetected.  Li et al suggested 
that further investigation needed to be carried out on the 
effectiveness of N=2, N=3 etc. 
In this vein, we have chosen to focus our research on the 
identification of malware using N-grams obtained from run-
time program traces.  We started with N=1 and have 
demonstrated that malware can be identified with a reduced 
set of features.  Initial investigation has shown that for N=1, 
149 features are produced in the raw dataset.  Increasing N=2 
produced 8092 features (no filtering).  Therefore, before 
continuing the research by increasing N, it is prudent to 
establishing a basis to filter the dataset to prevent feature 
explosion.   To this end, this research focuses on finding a 
filter to remove redundant features. 
The key weakness of static analysis is that the code 
analysed may not be the code that actually runs, which is 
particularly true for obfuscated programs that employ 
polymorphic or metamorphic techniques.  Due to the high 
level of obfuscation employed by malware writers, dynamic 
analysis is used to find indicators of malware. 
VII. OP-CODE PRE-FILTERING 
N-gram analysis presents a dimensionality problem in 
terms of the number of raw features produced and if left 
unfiltered would result in a SVM training phase with a high 
computation cost.  To reduce this effort and narrow the area of 
search, this research aims to identify filters that can select the 
optimum features prior to feeding them to a SVM.  The 
hypothesis is: Malware that employs evasion techniques will 
exhibit telltale signs in terms of run-time op-codes; such as a 
higher density of instructions that are commonly used in 
polymorphic engines within malware.  Therefore filtering out 
irrelevant op-codes and allowing the SVM to focus on a 
subset will result in a fast training phase. 
A. Hypothesis test 
Firstly, considering the null hypothesis: Benign and 
malicious software produce the same op-code distributions; as 
rejectoHa
oHo




 
Ho – The sample data belong/fits into the distribution of the 
original dataset. 
Ha – If the sample data does not fit into the original dataset, 
the inference is that the two datasets are different. 
As both sets of data are large and the mean and standard 
deviation can be calculated, the critical Z formula is used as 
shown; 
  
 ox 
)/( n
 
Where –  Z = test statistic; 
x = test data mean; 
µ0 = mean of parent group; 
n = Sample size;  
 = standard deviation of population; 
Table 2 lists the calculated Z values.  A large value of Z 
indicates that those distributions are likely to belong to 
different groups and are therefore more likely to indicate a 
difference between benign and malicious software.  On the 
other hand, a small value of Z would indicate that the two 
distributions belong to the same group and are therefore 
unlikely to make a good indicator of malware.  The Z values 
do not present any meaningful correlation to those op-codes 
selected by the SVM and therefore would not make an 
appropriate filter, but are listed here for completeness. 
B. Area of intersect 
Secondly, consider the simplistic characteristics of benign 
and malicious op-codes with a normal distribution as shown in 
Fig. 4.  The plots are grouped into density curves for benign 
and malicious software of a single op-code. The horizontal 
axis relates to the percentage of a given program that is made 
up of a particular op-code and the vertical axis indicates the 
number of programs with that percentage of op-code.  The key 
feature to note is the overlapping area of the two density 
curves. The greater the difference between the mean of the 
curves and narrower the standard deviation reduces the 
overlapping area and therefore reduces the interference and 
corresponding misclassification of the benign and malicious 
software. 
 
Fig. 4 Ideal characteristics 
This implies that a simple analysis of low order statistics, such 
as calculating the product of the mean and the inverse of the 
standard deviation to determine the overlapping area would 
yield the best indicators (op-codes) of benign and malicious 
software.  Hence, calculating the overlapping area for the 
density curves should provide a numerical value to those 
indicators. Using- 
   
           
 
 
Where –  A = area of benign density curve. 
B = area of malware density curve. 
C = area of intersect of the two density curves. 
The above equation produced the results shown in Fig. 5.  
These results need to be placed in a context that provides 
meaning in term of relative importance.  Those op-codes 
chosen by the SVM as the optimal indicators are highlighted. 
It can be seen that those op-codes chosen by the SVM do 
correlate in part with those op-codes sorted by the area least 
intersect. While it is not a direct match, setting a filter criteria 
that selects op-codes with a area of insect of less than 50% 
does not eliminate any of the optimal op-codes and removes 
75% of those op-codes that provide no values in the 
classification of benign and malicious software.  However, a 
important op-code (adc) has been removed by the ‘area of 
insect filter’ and therefore cannot be considered a useful tool 
for removing irrelevant op-codes. 
 
Fig. 5 Benign & Malicious area of intersect 
The SVM selected: ja, adc, sub, inc, rep and add as 
indicators of benign and malicious software.  The second most 
important op-code adc is filtered out by the ‘area of intersect’ 
filter which contradicts the hypothesis that op-codes with the 
least area of intersect make the best indicator of benign and 
malicious software. This is clearly not the case.  Two further 
points need to be considered.  Firstly, the overall density of a 
particular op-code needs to be considered in the context of 
their area of intersect and its population as it needs to be 
significantly important to be considered as an indicator of 
benign and malicious software.  Taking ja and rep op-codes 
(SVM selected range) as reference points, it can see from the 
data presented in Table 2 that the other op-codes relating to 
population and area of intersect fall within the characteristics 
of ja and rep.  Therefore the area of intersect does not tell the 
full story as many other op-codes such as ret, call, etc have 
lower area of intersect than ja and a population that lays 
between both rep and ja.  In addition the ‘area intersect’ filter 
removes the adc op-code.  Low dimensional analysis does not 
consider covariance i.e. the relationship between the 
distributions of one op-code with that of another op-code. 
Table 2 Op-code Statistics 
Op-code % occurrence % area of 
intersect 
Z-Value 
add 6.10 10.76 0.35378 
test 3.16 15.07 0.52379 
sub 2.67 16.25 0.463953 
rep 6.31 17.53 0.455446 
ret 1.85 18.82 0.504489 
call 1.91 23.30 0.536635 
jnb 1.41 23.50 0.419838 
inc 5.24 24.59 0.543303 
movzx 1.66 24.62 0.9687 
jb 1.66 25.83 0.499322 
dec 1.67 26.28 0.535424 
lea 2.56 29.76 0.896827 
stos 0.45 30.44 0.813775 
pop 3.51 30.72 0.649154 
xor 2.29 32.29 0.821013 
ja 1.17 32.20 0.641516 
and 1.01 34.72 0.962486 
sbb 0.09 35.32 0.784135 
shr 0.67 35.44 0.776227 
jmp 1.83 36.98 0.677423 
leave 0.45 37.46 0.395372 
nop 0.34 40.72 0.848149 
jbe 0.27 39.57 0.57276 
shl 0.55 40.92 0.600475 
jl 0.38 42.52 0.896412 
sar 0.25 44.27 0.64066 
movsx 0.23 45.11 0.647835 
je 4.52 45.18 0.851666 
jge 0.27 48.26 0.708946 
imul 0.30 48.71 0.93168 
push 7.99 48.98 0.54069 
repne 0.32 49.28 0.732861 
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As shown in Fig. 5, it is not always the case that op-codes 
with a low area of intersect produce the best indicators of 
benign and malicious software.  This requires a closer 
inspection of the op-code distribution curve to understand the 
characteristics that make the best indicators chosen by the 
SVM over the other op-codes that have similar area of 
intersect and population. 
C. Linear Programming 
The previous explanation (Fig. 4) considered a normal 
probability distribution.  Therefore, further investigation is 
required to understand how the area under each curve is 
interpreted when a decision plane is applied.  Linear 
Programming (LP) [23] is a technique that is applied to 
optimise a linear function when subject to linear equality and 
inequality constraints.  LP can be applied to the classification 
of benign and malicious software.  The components of LP are- 
Constraints - The data is in the form of a probability 
density curve. The horizontal axis represents the makeup of a 
program i.e. the op-code percentage that makes up a program 
and the vertical axis, representing the number of programs that 
have that percentage of op-codes.  The probability density is 
based on a percentage of op-code counts obtained from traces 
during the execution of a program.  The minimum value is 0 
and the maximum is the percentage of the most occurring op-
code within the captured dataset (mov).  Thus the maximum 
value is 0.4 (40%). 
Decision Variable - this is the value found during the 
search for the maximum or minimum point.  It is the 
percentage of a particular op-code that yields the greatest area 
of benign and malicious density that lies either side of the 
decision plane. 
Objective function - is the numerical expression used to 
define the goal of the task.  The mathematical input to the LP 
is the cumulative probability as the decision variable is 
incremented across the range (illustrated in Fig. 6).  Therefore 
the maximum classification would be achieved when the two 
density curves do not intersect and their entire area lies on 
their respective side of the decision plane, as- 
BwhenABA  ;1;1  
 
 
Fig. 6 Linear Programming Optimisation 
Listed below is the Matlab script used to calculate the 
optimum decision point. 
 
 
Fig. 7 ret op-code probability density curve 
Fig. 7 shows the density distribution of the ret op-code for 
both benign and malicious software.  It can be seen that a 
software program with a ret density of 0.001 is much more 
likely to be malicious that benign software.  To distinguish 
between benign and malicious software and to determine the 
likelihood of a correct classification, the optimum value has to 
be obtained and the respective areas that lie either side of the 
optimum decision plane have to be assessed.  The cumulative 
density curves are calculated, as the decision variable is 
incremented across the density curves, as shown in Fig. 8. 
 
Fig. 8 Cumulative Probability Density with Cost function 
In Fig. 8, a cost function calculates the area under each 
curve and identifies the optimum decision point (0.022).  This 
point marks the optimum value that should be used to 
maximise the correct classification of benign and malicious 
software.  Fig. 8 shows a cumulative probability density of 84% 
lying either side of a decision plane at 0.022.  Therefore, a 
software program with a value greater than 0.022 is highly 
likely (84%) to be benign software; and programs with values 
less than 0.022 are highly likely to be malicious. 
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stepSize = 0.001;
endofData = 0.4;
range = endofData/stepSize;
result1 = [];
result2 = [];
for i = 1:1: range
    result1 = [result1; ((sum(f(i:range))/sum(f)))];
    result2 = [result2; (1- (sum(f2(i:range))/sum(f2)))];
end;
result3 = abs(result1 - result2);
% minimum point that represents the maximum density either side of the 
decision plane.
min(result3)
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Considering ‘false friends’: Those op-codes that appear at 
first glance to have the potential to detect malicious software 
but fail to do so.  Fig. 9 shows the cumulative probability 
density for the je op-code with the decision plane optimised at 
0.045.  This example is purposely chosen as a worst op-code 
to demonstrate that the area of intersect and population are not 
the only contributing factors.  The optimum value yields a 
very poor predictor of malware as the area either side of the 
decision plane is 57% making is slightly better than guessing.  
Here we have seen that the je op-code had initially promising 
characteristics of a low area of intersect and a high population, 
yet the LP analysis of the je op-code showed that it only has a 
density of 57% either side of the decision plane.  The process 
is repeated for all the op-codes within this discussion and the 
results are listed in Table 3. 
 
 
Fig. 9 Cumulative Probability Density with Cost function 
Table 3 LP Decision Plane 
Op-
code 
Occurrence 
% 
area of intersect 
% 
Optimised 
Decision plane 
% 
pop 2.60 28.70 70 
push 8.87 48.98 64 
je 6.53 45.18 57 
add 4.35 10.75 56 
test 3.16 15.07 56 
sub 2.67 16.25 60 
rep 6.31 17.53 78 
ret 4.54 18.82 84 
call 4.60 23.30 78 
jnb 1.41 23.50 54 
inc 5.24 24.59 66 
mov 40.76 24.62/(49.7) 72 (unstable) 
jb 1.66 25.83 54 
dec 1.67 26.28 54 
lea 1.74 29.29 72 
stos 0.45 30.44 56 
pop 3.51 30.72 56 
xor 2.29 29.23 58 
ja 1.17 32.20 57 
While there are no clear boundaries of what makes a good 
or bad indicator of malicious software, the LP analysis has 
placed a numerical value upon those op-codes discussed in 
this section (Table 3).  Clearly op-codes with 50% of their 
area either side of the decision plane make very poor 
indicators of malware, whereas op-codes with a high area 
either side of the decision plane make better indicators.  
Therefore, using this criteria LP has demonstrated that cmp, 
push, je, add and pop are less effective that ret and lea. 
However, two op-codes remain of interest, call and mov.  The 
call op-code has a high area either side of decision place (78%) 
which merits further investigation.  While the mov op-code 
has an area of 72% either side of the decision plane, its 
behaviour when analysed by Pearson’s correlation, SVM and 
LP merits further examination as to why mov has a negative 
impact on malware identification. 
Fig. 10 shows the density distribution of the mov op-code 
for both benign and malicious software.  It can be seen that 
the distributions are substantially interleaved as compared to 
the ret op-code as shown in Fig. 7.  In addition, during 
analysis, it was noted that small changes in the calculation 
step size produced dramatic changes in the results.  In an 
attempt to stabilise the results, the data is processed using a 
KSdensity function, which is a Kernel density estimation 
function that performs data smoothing by projecting data 
population based on a normal kernel profile [25] and is shown 
in Fig. 11. 
 
 
Fig. 10 mov Density Distribution 
 
Fig. 11 KS Density Curve for mov 
Calculating the area of intersect for the KS density curve fit 
on the mov op-code resulted in an intersect area increasing 
from 15.55% to 49.70%.  Clearly, the granularity of the 
LP Benign & Malicious Density Curve for je
Percentage of  an opcode within dataset
Malicious Software Density curve
Optimum Descision Plane
O
p
c
o
d
e
 o
c
c
u
rr
e
n
c
e
 w
it
h
in
 a
 p
ro
g
ra
m
0.045
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.200.00 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
Benign Software Density curve
Decision Plane
Percentage of  an opcode within dataset
O
p
c
o
d
e
 o
c
c
u
rr
e
n
c
e
 w
it
h
in
 a
 p
ro
g
ra
m
Malicious Software
Benign Software
Density Distribution for mov
Percentage of  an opcode within dataset
Malicious Software Density curve
O
p
c
o
d
e
 o
c
c
u
rr
e
n
c
e
 w
it
h
in
 a
 p
ro
g
ra
m
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.200.00 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
Benign Software Density curve
Decision Plane
Malicious Software
Benign Software
KS Density Curve for mov
analysis of the mov op-code greatly affects the results and 
implies an unstable indicator.  
Fig. 12 shows both the raw density curve and its KS density 
curve fit for the call op-code.  The raw data shows 
interleaving and some clustering of the two density curves 
(benign and malicious) as highlighted by the KS density 
curves fit.  While this is an improvement over the mov op-
code, comparing it to the ret op-code as shown in Fig. 12, it 
can be seen that the ret op-code presents better separation 
between the two density curves (benign and malicious). 
Calculating the area of intersect for KS density fit on the call 
op-code increases the area slightly from 24.81% to 25.6%, 
implying stability as opposed to the unstable results seen with 
mov. 
Performing the same comparison (raw data versus KS 
density) for ret and lea gave 13.69% dropping to 6.81% and 
24.81% increasing to 25.63 respectively.  
 
 
Fig. 12 Distribution of call op-code 
 
 
Fig. 13 Distribution of ret op-code 
While the statistical analysis presented in this section aids 
the understanding and identification of those op-codes that 
make the best indications, their comparison to SVM ability is 
somewhat compromised as the SVM is more than the sum of 
the individual op-codes; it is the covariance matrix i.e. 
comparison between different variables.  The remapping 
performed by the SVM on the input dataset into feature space 
improves the data separation and thus improves both the 
accuracy and robustness of the classifier.  In addition, the 
SVM has the cumulative effect of considering a set of op-
codes rather than individual op-codes.  But, the relative 
importance of individual op-codes is valid. 
D. Subspace 
An alternative approach to determine the importance of the 
individual op-codes, thereby ranking their usefulness as 
classification features, is to investigate the eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors in subspace.  Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) is a transformation of the covariance matrix and it is 
defined as [24]: 
    
 
   
                    
 
   
 
Where –    C =.Covariance matrix of PCA transformation; 
X=.dataset value; 
X   = .dataset mean; 
n and m = data length; 
This is a technique used to compress data by mapping the 
data into a subspace while retaining most of the 
information/variation in the data.  It reduces the 
dimensionality by mapping the data into a subspace and 
finding a new set of variables (fewer variables) that represent 
the original data.  These new variables are called principal 
components (PCs) and are uncorrelated and are ordered by 
their contribution (usefulness/eigenvalue) to the total 
information that each contain. 
Firstly, to determine the number of PCs that correlate to 
greater than 95% of the data variance, PCA is used.  The 
results show that eight values accounted for 99.5% of the 
variance; therefore the eight largest (most significant) 
eigenvalues are used to locate the most significant 
eigenvectors (meaningfully data). 
As PCA is an algorithm that operates on variance of data i.e. 
a covariance matrix of the training dataset, which is calculated 
in Matlab as follows: 
                     
             
          
Calculating the significant values by multiplying the 
significant eigenvector Column by the respective eigenvalues 
and then summing each row 
        
 
   
 
Where –    R = Sum of the matrix variance; 
C = Covariance; 
V = eigenvector; 
= EigenValue matrix; 
d= EigenValue scalar; 
The results are illustrated in Table 3, note 3->7 values are 
not shown due to layout considerations. 
Table 3 Ranking by Eigenvector 
Op-
code 
x[1..149] 
(10
-3
) 
2x[1..149] 
(10
-3
) 
..x[1..149] 
(10
-3
) 
8x[1..149] 
(10
-3
)  
 
   
 
(10
-3
) 
rep 4.79808 5.7494 .. 0.009 11.81529 
mov 6.78336 6.78336 .. 0.03066 9.05347 
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add 2.8656 2.8656 .. 0.03066 8.06337 
push 2.23008 2.08845 .. 0.0693 6.69625 
adc 1.46304 1.80965 .. 0.0051 3.91844 
sub 0.74688 1.9006 .. 0.01953 3.60979 
inc 0.20928 0.20928 .. 0.03669 3.05887 
je 0.81024 0.6698 .. 0.0231 2.80649 
cmp 1.70304 0.1207 .. 0.06282 2.68178 
pop 0.96672 0.63155 .. 0.03018 2.44806 
test 0.79872 0.8789 .. 0.05628 2.25302 
ja 0.41568 0.95965 .. 0.1449 1.97699 
jnb 0.31392 0.7616 .. 0.11751 1.66773 
jb 0.25824 0.8279 .. 0.08028 1.54664 
call 0.6096 0.55845 .. 0.02712 1.54664 
Table 3 has been sorted based on the sum (largest first) of the 
eigenvectors and are displayed in Fig. 3 and is overlayed with 
those op-codes chosen by SVM as the optimal features for 
detecting malware.  The ‘eigenvector’ filter has not only 
correctly chosen those op-codes selected by the SVM but has 
grouped them in to the most significant range (highest 
eigenvector/eigenvalues).
 
Fig. 4 Eigenvector magnitude 
Given that the six SVM chosen op-codes have been grouped 
into the top twelve op-codes i.e. top 8% thereby removing the 
92% irrelevant op-codes makes this an effective filtering 
mechanism to reduce features prior to the SVM training phase. 
VIII. DISCUSSION 
Malware has a long history of evolutionary development as 
the war between the anti-malware researchers and the 
malware writers has progressed.  This study presents an 
argument for the analysis of run-time op-code trace to detect 
malware. 
Firstly, Op-code traces are captured for both benign and 
malicious software in the form of dynamic traces of each 
program.  This data is marshalled and used as both the training 
and validation datasets. 
Secondly, a SVM performs analysis on all the available op-
codes and identifies the best indicators of malware, which is 
used to create a reference datum for the filters. 
Finally, several filter criteria are tested against the reference 
datum generated by the SVM. 
While this research is still ongoing, evidence exists to show 
that a subset of op-codes can be used to detect malware; and 
applying a filter to the features can reduce the SVM training 
phase.  This has established an efficient approach to 
investigate the variables of N-gram N=2, N=3 etc.  It is 
proposed that the findings provide a basis for further research 
in order to identify key op-codes or groups of op-codes (N-
grams) that can be used to detect malware, negating evading 
techniques employed by the malware writers. 
Bilar [6] demonstrated a difference in structure between 
benign and malicious software, which has been borne out by 
the finding produced by the SVM. 
Lakhotia et al [1] presented a method to statically detect 
obfuscated calls relating to push, pop and ret op-codes that are 
mapped to stack operations.  However, their approach did not 
model situations where the push and pop instructions are 
decomposed into multiple instructions, such as directly 
manipulating the stack pointer using mov commands. The 
method proposed in this paper investigates the full spectrum 
of op-codes to identify key op-code characteristics that will 
yield valuable indicators for malware detection. 
While Lakhotia et al [1] and Bilar [2] methods use static 
analysis, the approach presented in this paper uses dynamic 
analysis and therefore evaluate actual execution paths as 
opposed to evaluating all possible paths through the program 
that is normally done when static analysis is used. 
The results obtained from this experiment shown that high-
density op-codes such as mov are not good indicators of 
malware.  However, less frequent op-codes such as ja, adc, 
sub, inc and add make better indicators of malware, which 
confirms Bilar [2] claim that the 14 most occurring op-codes 
do not provide a good indication of malware with the 
exception of the add op-code, as listed in Table 4 (shadded 
area indicate op-codes selected by the SVM).  While there is 
no numerical relationship between Bilar and the SVM results, 
LP and eigenvector analysis are introduced to identify a pre-
classification filter and append a meaningful numerical value 
in terms of their ability to indentify malware.  While the ‘area 
of intersect’ filter identifies five of the op-codes chosen by the 
SVM it missed an important op-code adc.  The ‘eigenvector’ 
filter correctly indentifies all the op-codes chosen by the SVM.  
A point to note is that eigenvector filter ranked the mov op-
code as the second best indicator of malware which 
contradicts the other analysis.  Therefore the ‘eigenvector’ 
filter adequately removes irrelevant op-codes but does not 
guarantee that all the selected op-codes make the best 
indicators of malware. 
Table 4 Op-code Importance 
Op-
code 
SVM Area Subspace Bilar  
Population 
mov   2 25% 
push  32 4 19% 
call  6 15 9% 
pop    6% 
cmp    5% 
jz    4% 
lea    4% 
test  2  3% 
jmp    3% 
add 5 1 3 3% 
jnz    3% 
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ret  5 16 2% 
xor  13 17 2% 
and    1% 
rep 6 4 1  
ja 1 17 12  
inc 4 8 7  
adc 2  5  
sub 3 3 6  
Note -  indicates that the op-code was not ranked high 
enough to be considered 
Further investigation is required to determine the 
interrelationship between op-codes, N-gram size and their 
ability to act as good indicators of malicious software. The 
investigation will need to identify and exclude misleading data 
as is exhibited by the mov op-code, which has an immense 
negative impact on the correct classification of benign and 
malicious software. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This paper, proposes the use of SVM as a means of 
identifying malware. It shows that malware, that is 
packet/encrypted, can be detected using SVMs and by using 
the op-codes chosen by the SVM as a benchmark, identified a 
pre-filter stage using eigenvectors that can reduce the feature 
set and therefore reduce the training effort.  The results 
presented in this paper exposed three key points. 
 Firstly, the identification of a high population op-code: 
mov that is not only is a poor indicator of benign/malicious 
software, but inhibits the ability to correctly classify software 
when used with other op-codes such as ja, adc, sub, inc, add 
and rep. 
Secondly, a subset of op-codes can be used to detect 
malware.  However, the SVM analysis demonstrates that ja, 
adc and sub are strong indicators of malware as they are four 
times more likely to be used in the correct classification of 
malware than the next most significant op-codes (inc).  
Several op-codes have been identified as potential indicators 
of malware, which provides the basis for an improvement in 
detection techniques beyond current state of the art [3].  
Finally, using the ‘eigenvector’ pre-filter, the dataset can 
safely remove irrelevant features. 
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